Rescuing the Discourse of Community

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The political assumptions that underlie the rhetoric of the discourse community as it has been articulated in composition studies during the last decade seem to support democracy in principle, yet tend to undermine it in their practice. That is, the theory that situates writing and reading in the discursive processes people use to negotiate ground for their cooperation assumes that those people are more or less equal politically, that they have equal access to and equal influence upon the discourse that determines the beliefs and purposes they will share. But as thoughtful proponents as well as critics of this rhetoric have noted, once enacted these processes tend to minimize or exclude the participation of some people as they establish the dominance of others.\(^1\) I believe this tendency is the function of the tacit ethical assumption that underlies these democratic political ones—that the ground for cooperation must be agreement. I characterize this assumption as ethical because it treats agreement as the primary collective good when it designates the elimination of disagreement as the end toward which the discourse of community ought to be directed. The problem is this ethics contradicts a democratic politics, a contradiction that is manifest when, in its drive toward agreement, a discourse over-looks, minimizes, or excludes difference. It does so by denying the presence of unresolved or unresolvable conflict, and denying in the process equal participation in the discourse to those who disagree.

It is this denial that provides reason for some commentators, like Joseph Harris, to argue that we should restrict our use of the concept of community in the study of writing and reading to the most concrete and local, and

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for others, like Thomas Kent, who find in the insularity of the discourse defined by this concept reason to eliminate it from our theoretical discussion of writing and reading altogether. My problem is that despite this denial of difference and the dangers to equality that it presents, I remain committed to the necessity of a broad concept of community because I believe that anyone's ideas and purposes find value and use when conceived and refined in the context of cooperating collectivities. And because neither persons nor collectivities are insular and autonomous, because they are always interconnected and interdependent, I am unwilling to abandon the theoretical project of articulating how people can pursue their own interests in ways that contribute positively to the pursuits of differing others as well as to the cooperative pursuit of interests that are shared. So my general purpose here is to address the problem that the discourse of community tends to deny full participation to people who differ by offering a critique of the assumptions that underlie concept as a first step towards its redefinition.

Specifically, the inequality that tends to develop in every community, regardless how democratic its professed ideology might be, prompts me to seek some ethical ground for collectivity other than the assumption that people's connections take the form of their agreements. This assumption marks the point where a reconception of community—and a redefinition of the discourse that constitutes it—might begin. I want to argue that if the political function of an ethical discourse of community is to constitute and maintain a democratic collectivity, then participation in that discourse must be guided by an ethics that directs people to value their differences because that is what enables their cooperation as equals. But first I need to clear a space for that argument by reviewing two critiques of community as it is constituted in the conventional discourse of agreement, critiques that expose the tendency of that discourse of community to deny or exclude difference. Then, drawing on the work of two ethicists for whom the primary ground for cooperation is the commitment of personal relation, I'll sketch the shape of an alternative discourse that directs people to locate that ground on the terms of their conflicts. Finally, I'll describe how the rhetoric enacted in this redefined discourse of community locates writing and reading, and its teaching, within the project of constituting and maintaining a collectivity of equals.

Two Critiques of Communities of Agreement

Iris Marion Young's 1990 critique of community focuses on the political dilemma of people who have democratic intentions but assume that their cooperation must be founded upon their agreement. She argues that this
assumption drives them in their discourse toward articulating homogenizing relations of mutuality or polarizing relations of antagonism, constituting in the first case a community that denies difference and in the second a community that excludes it. Politically, the assumption that collectivity is enacted, in her words, in a “reciprocal recognition and identification with others”—that in ethical terms its binding value is agreement—undermines the equality that is essential to democracy “because it denies difference in the sense of making it difficult for people to respect those with whom they do not identify” (311). What she seeks instead is a concept of collectivity that locates cooperation in difference itself by requiring people to reconceive their connection “as a relationship of strangers who do not understand one another in a subjective and immediate sense.” (317). This conception of an ethical collectivity that is constituted in relation rather than agreement assumes that difference is inherent in and integral to social life. It also assumes that collectivity is a process rather than a state of being, that it is itself an ongoing discourse in which people continually redefine their commonality in the terms that emerge from discussion of their differences.

I believe with Young that if the discursive process of building and maintaining collectivity is to be democratic, it must be guided by both a recognition of the necessity of difference, and an acknowledgement that in a cooperative confrontation of difference people can maintain a discussion that enables their equality in collectivity. Indeed, this recognition provides the substance and this acknowledgment the bond that sustains democracy. Young envisions the discourse that follows as “a moving and contradictory process” in which a “multiplicity of actions and structures . . . cohere and contradict,” but in describing it she abandons the concept of community altogether in favor of the concept of a “politics” (315). Because she believes that the concept of community cannot be separated from the demand for agreement, she describes an alternative discourse that articulates connection through “a politics of difference” that acknowledges “misunderstanding, withdrawal, and conflict [as] always possible conditions of social being” (310). Within this confrontation of equality in difference, ethical cooperation can proceed.

However, the assumption that cooperation can be founded solely upon difference—that difference is the primary collective good—has a problem of its own: the shared commitment to cooperation that it supports is tenuous. When a demand for collective action becomes urgent, “strangers” connected together only by an agreement to respect their differences can find themselves required to subordinate that respect to pragmatic necessity—in effect, they may have to consent to something while agreeing to disagree about it, postponing in the process both their conflict and their
equality in order to get their collective work done. Perpetuating that sort of postponement is the project of a pluralism that grounds cooperation among differing people on an agreement to compartmentalize their conflicts—to ignore, intercept, or, if necessary, deny them. The problem is that a discourse of pluralism functions politically like a discourse of agreement: it maintains connection and cooperation by excluding the most divisive forces of difference. My focus on this problem is prompted by Ellen Rooney’s 1989 critique of the pluralist discourse of recent American literary theory where diverse voices postpone indefinitely the clash of fundamental differences in a shared conviction that each can “master otherness in the figure of persuasion” (251). The very concept of persuasion itself, Rooney argues, assumes that anyone can eventually be brought to agree with any position—the ethical assumption that agreement is primary collective good. To escape that assumption, Rooney suggests that we think of collectivity as constituted not in agreements but in “alliances” where differences are openly acknowledged and negotiated. Her assertion that “genuine . . . community can only be constructed across understood and examined conflict” (237) suggests that such alliances take the form of a discourse that examines differences in a way that enables people to identify, quite precisely, their points of connection.

Rooney uses the term community in this statement in a way that suggests that the concept might be rescued from an ethics of agreement by a discourse that directs people to identify and explore their conflicts, that this kind of discourse itself is what binds people together in a collectivity of equals. She suggests that such a discourse might both counter the fragmenting force of conflict and protect the political equality which conflict enacts. But Rooney does not describe this discourse. Like Young, she does not explain how people can use their differences as ground for their cooperation. At one point she suggests that self-interest might do that—that people maintain alliances when doing so meets their separate needs. But because I am trying to rescue a broader concept of community, I am looking for bonds more sharable than that. Specifically, I am trying to describe a rhetoric that can direct people in a discourse to acknowledge and examine their differences as the means by which they constitute themselves as a cooperating collectivity. To do that, I need to articulate an ethics that designates as the end of this discourse an accommodation of the contradictory demands of difference and collectivity.

**Toward an Ethics of Relation**

Read together, the work of two ethicists, Nel Noddings and Edith Wyschogrod, describes an ethics that might enable people to negotiate
collectivity from the terms of their differences by locating that negotiation upon the ground of relational commitments that bind them in cooperation across their conflicts. This reading begins with Noddings' discussion of an ethics of care that relies on the empathetic identification of one person with another to bridge difference. In describing how differing people can ground cooperation upon relational commitment, Noddings describes a collectivity of equals that seems more cohesive than one grounded upon the atomistic assumptions of pluralism. But Nodding's ethics needs the correction of Wyschogrod's. Wyschogrod suggests that for these people to remain equal, their relational commitment must take some form other than empathy because empathy functions despite the best of intentions to reread difference as the same. She proposes an alternative mode of relation characterized by attitudes and actions of a kind of provisional deference. Specifically, Wyschogrod argues that a discourse that values difference prompts statements that acknowledge it and that measure the distance that divides its participants rather than, initially at least, statements that assert a common identity. Constructed from the resources provided by conflict, this discourse leads its participants to rearticulate continually provisional ground for cooperation in response to and in terms of the conflicting ground articulated by others. In doing so, itlocates the divisive intellectual work of critical resistance within the cooperative project of examining difference in order to negotiate connections that cross it.

I'll explain this ethics further by beginning again with Noddings. She rejects any concept of community founded primarily upon shared commitment to common principles or even to common projects. For Noddings, such communities are constituted in the "striving" of individuals who are each "moving toward something, trying to excel, intending to win" (Women 182). For them, connection functions as "an extension of the self" (Women 189). The efforts of these people may be parallel and may occasionally be cooperative, but the commitments and purposes that drive them remain individual and that makes their cooperation contingent upon a compatibility ensured by agreement. This individualism is the focus of Noddings' critique of ethical systems that require of community a common commitment to principle. While they can direct people toward actions that support the common good, these systems keep people separate in both their motivation and intention, making their connection vulnerable to conflict. Noddings' concern is that bonds of connection so self-interested are readily undermined by conflicting interpretations of principles and the actions they imply. That is why, for her, ethical collectivity must be grounded upon commitments to the people with whom working principles or projects might be shared, commitments they enact in relations of "re-
ceptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness" (Caring 2). As she puts it, this kind of community is grounded upon "a relational attitude . . . that posits the relation as more basic than the individual" (Women 154). This is because individuals "are defined in relation" (236)—"by the set of relations into which [they have] been thrown" (237).

The ethical assumption that directs a discourse to constitute collectivity in relation rather than upon principle designates a mutual enactment of "responsibility and response" (Women 185) instead of an achievement of agreement as the primary common good. When people's primary common commitment is to their equal relation, the practice of this receptivity and responsiveness becomes the cooperative project that supports every other. The problem I find here is that the ethical act that sustains this primary project is empathy—an attempt to receive another's reality as one's own that is Noddings' paradigm for ethical relation. As Wysogrod points out, an act of empathy is inherently an interpretation that eclipses, at least partially, the full reality of another's difference: it directs me to "understand" another in my own terms. Wysogrod, too, locates both self and community within relational commitments, but for her, ethical relation must take the form of an exchange that acknowledges that full mutual understanding is impossible. This acknowledgement is enacted in a discourse of deference that allows another's interests, another's terms, to displace—initially, at least, "for the purposes of argument"—one's own. In other words, she describes a relation and a discourse that begins with a "recognition of the primacy of the other person and the dissolution of self-interest" (xiv).

Wysogrod justifies the ethical necessity of this difficult stance in her critique of the concept of agency. Defining agency as "a property of the self in its efforts to maintain its own interests," she defines the action of an agent as "work," and work as an attempt by that agent "to make the world manageable" in which, by necessity, "the world's otherness is lost" (63). This notion of work, as the method of "the self's world-shaping" (80), describes well what Noddings condemns as "striving." In doing so, her critique of agency explains how even the empathetic relation Noddings advocates can constitute a collectivity that eventually denies coequality in difference. And it assists me in my attempt to rescue the concept of community from that denial by suggesting why a collectivity of agents-at-work is maintained by a discourse that directs the articulation of agreements—agreements that, as agreements among agents, must rule out the coequality of differing others.

In Wysogrod's contrasting ethics difference becomes the very substance of relation because relation is defined as an act in which agency is provisionally relinquished. As she puts it:
If the starting point of ethics is not the self but the Other, the conditions of agency, conditions stemming from one's own freedom and well-being, cannot provide the criteria for moral action. Beginning with the other entails not only constraints on freedom and well-being, but the recognition of the constitutive character of alterity for the moral discourse and practice presupposed by these constraints. (70–71)

Wyschogrod describes this as labor, using the term in a way that suggests the shape of a discourse that is not agent-directed. While work is "the creation of an entity that will conform to the worker's intentions" (83), and thus a form of "self-empowerment" (96), labor takes the form of a "total... involvement in the needs and interests of others" (85). It is inherently "self-renouncing" (96) because its intention and function "breaks up the unity of the self" (122). The ethical stance of people who work requires them to cooperate in the project of eliminating their differences, while the ethical stance of people who labor requires them to cooperate in deferring agreement until they have examined their differences together. In terms that address the problem of community, work drives people with conflicting intentions to a crisis of collectivity while labor directs them to use those conflicts to undermine the intensity of their separate intentions. In a word, labor "expresses itself as patience" (99).

Wyschogrod proposes an ethics that directs people to attend to the differences they confront in those with whom they are committed to cooperate, and to do so as the primary task in the ongoing project of maintaining their collectivity. That task directs people to determine their individual intentions in terms that emerge from the conflictual context of their relations. The problem with her proposal is that in rhetorical practice, the deference she describes has as much potential for undermining equal participation as empathy—denying one's own difference undermines democracy as readily as denying the difference of another. The kind of agency she critiques may direct individuals to compete for dominance and deny equal participation to differing others, but the kind of deference she describes as its alternative may engage them in a counter-competition for submission in which they deny full participation to themselves. But I think these opposing notions of agency and deference need not be read as polar principles of social action. Rather, they can be read as alternating attitudes that, practiced interdependently, constitute ethical participation in the discursive exchanges of assertion and response that maintain human relations. Enacted separately as absolute principles, both deny the coequality of difference, but practiced together within the provisionality of an ongoing discourse, they can maintain the ground for a collectivity of equals. This reading of Wyschogrod's proposal enables me to suggest the shape of
a relational ethics of rhetoric that directs people to determine their interests and to determine their intentions in terms of the conflicting demands made by collectivity and difference. In this context, agency and deference become temporary and contextual—agency is constructed and reconstructed continually from the insights that emerge in a provisionally deferential exchange with differing others.

Toward the Practice of a Democratic Discourse

I now want to restate this ethics in terms that situate writing and reading within the project of maintaining this kind of democratic community. To do that, I need to draw on a third ethicist, one whose purpose and conclusion are quite different from mine. The purpose of Alasdair MacIntyre's general argument, which assumes that ethical community must be founded upon agreements in values, is to assert that the extent of the conflicts that pervade contemporary culture make such community impossible except on a limited scale. His conclusion is that community in our time is possible only among people who are more or less equals and agree upon core values. By contrast, the purpose of my argument is to describe a discourse that might enlarge and diversify the concept of community by offering a method for discussion—a rhetoric—that includes as equals people who differ in their own values and in their power to influence those of others. My conclusion is that, given democratic values, the very diversity that diminishes MacIntyre's hope for collectivity to the local requires us to find ways to constituted community—to enact the web of interdependency and cooperation that concept implies—in ways that acknowledge and accommodate broad differences. This demands a discourse that we can use to ground cooperation and commonality upon the terms that emerge from examination of our conflicts. To begin describing that discourse—describing a rhetoric of democratic community—I must borrow from MacIntyre but adapt a notion that is central to his concept of community, the notion of "practice."

For MacIntyre, community is constituted by practices that direct diverse individual purposes toward a common project. Participation in such a practice, which he defines as an organized and cooperative activity in which people both draw upon and contribute to the knowledge and skill that guide the participation of all, transforms individual action into collective progress. This transformation characterizes his notion of practice. Describing practices as "milieus of conflict" (Whose 12), as "continuities of debate and enquiry" in which knowledge and skill is invented, challenged, revised, and made collective (327), MacIntyre locates ethical action in the
relationships that practitioners maintain through their discourse of work. In doing so, he describes ethics itself using the Aristotelian notion of friendship that is, in Aristotle's words, "the bond that holds communities together" (1155a24ff), one that takes the form of the reciprocated wish of each for the other's good (1155b29ff, qtd. in *After* 164). It is at this point where I can offer an alternative notion of practice. For MacIntyre, that wish for the other's good takes the discursive form of an empathetic assertion of what that other's good might be. For me, it must take the form of a response that begins with an open consideration of how that other's conception of the good, as that other has articulated it, might inflect my own. That is because any practice that is to maintain equal relations must begin not with commonality but with difference—not by identifying one's self with another, but by measuring and considering the consequences of the distance that divides self from other.

MacIntyre's description of practice is a description of work, in Wyschogrod's use of that term. But in noting that "To enter into a practice is to enter into a relationship . . . with its . . . practitioners" (*After* 194), and in asserting that knowledge and skill in a practice can "only be achieved by subordinating ourselves within the practice in our relationship with other practitioners" (191), he enables me to situate the instrumental work of a practice within what Wyschogrod describes as a larger project of relational labor. For MacIntyre, community comprises a collectivity of practitioners made interdependent by their commitment to the common project they maintain through the discourse of their practice. But the function of this discourse is to transform differences into the agreements that his concept of community requires, to maintain, in his terms, the "mutual regard" that emerges from a "shared allegiance" to "excellence" in a particular practice (*Whose* 42).

What limits MacIntyre's concept of community to the local is this transformation of diversity into a unitary notion of excellence.Founded as it is upon work, to use Wyschogrod's term, or upon striving, to use Noddings's, the individualistic commitment to collectivity he describes is sharable only as long as practitioners agree. By assuming that cooperation requires these relations of "mutual regard"—the common identity that emerges from this kind of agreement—MacIntyre promotes an exclusionary ground for collectivity that we can recognize as expertise. And while he doesn't feature that term, the extended discussions of medicine and chess he presents to exemplify his notion of practice suggest that expertise is his paradigm for community. A community constituted in a practice as he describes it is a community of experts. And the political function of expertise, as Belenky and her coauthors note in *Women's Ways of Knowing*, "involves maintaining or increasing the status differential between per-
sons” (184). I am trying to articulate an alternative concept of community that would function politically to engage people first in the project, again in the words of Belenky et al., of “bring[ing] the smallest, least members up into relations of equality” (184). To do that I am suggesting a reconceived notion of practice that can direct us toward a broader and broadening concept of community, one founded upon the relations of mutual regard that emerge from a shared project of enabling the equal participation of differing others. Here the practice that constitutes community is a cooperative project of locating the work of advancing shared expertise within the larger project of maintaining equal relations among people who differ.

In order to develop this alternative notion I must extend this critique of expertise in terms that return to the concept of persuasion. Persuasion is the core concept of a rhetorical tradition that treats a discourse as a process of mutual influence among people who must live and work together. Accordingly, people maintain collectivity in an ongoing exchange of assertions and responses where they determine provisional beliefs and purposes they can share. Ideally, this exchange is directed by an ethics that accommodates difference by directing an equitable examination of conflict. But the modern practice of the discourse of community, outlined clearly in MacIntyre’s notion of practice, cannot enact that ideal. When collectivity is constituted according to an ethics that values first expertise, the discourse that maintains it is not so much persuasive in that traditional sense as it is calculative. In his historical critique of the rise of expertise in the public culture of the United States, Eliot Friedson argues that the division among experts of the discourse that determines the values and purposes that guide the national community during the last century has limited the opportunity for people outside particular expert communities to participate meaningfully in negotiating beliefs and purposes they are to share. In his terms, when expertise dominates a discourse of community that discourse “is not democratic, not open to the active participation of all” (5). Rather, it directs a community “toward rule by technique rather than rule by public debate” by defining as collective the values and purposes that promote the “functional efficiency,” in Friedson’s term, of the practices of a variety of experts (8).

When this happens, the discourse of community is fragmented and compartmentalized. It becomes a discourse of pluralism that denies conflicts of consequence by dismantling their elements and distributing them to the experts who are credentialed to address them. The problem is that this renders differences of consequence imperceptible in much the same way that the conflict signalled by the jarring sound of a dissonant chord,
to borrow Kenneth Burke's analogy, becomes imperceptible yet remains present when the notes of that chord are separated into a scale (229–30). The rise of expertise in American national culture and the increasing relegation of the discourse of that community to experts has undermined the coherence and the effectiveness of our culture's collectivity: when values and purposes to be shared by many are articulated in the isolated discourses of experts, they are unlikely to acknowledge and accommodate much diversity.

In conceiving community as practice, and defining practice as expertise, MacIntyre provides terms we can use to examine ethical issues we face in our classrooms. Like most institutions in our culture, our classrooms are part of a competitive public realm where individuals must develop the expertise that demonstrates their practical competence. Though elements of that process of development might be structured cooperatively, cooperation is usually only a means to the end of individual progress. This is not a practice even in MacIntyre's sense of that term, and this classroom is not a community even as he conceives it. Indeed, writing and reading as they are often taught—as an interpersonal means to individual ends—at best perpetuate and at worst methodologically inculcate the ethical contradiction he condemns as "bureaucratic individualism" in which people "aspire . . . not to be manipulated by others" while "directing towards others those very manipulative modes of relationship" they themselves resist (After 34). Certainly, they have little to do with what either Noddings or Wyschogrod would identify as ethical relations. And while this individualistic and ultimately authoritarian classroom has been under attack in our literature for some time, the solution is not, as I once thought it was, simply to reconstruct the classroom as a collectivity of practitioners engaged in a common project—at least not when the end of that project is expertise. A classroom in which students learn to function socially as differing but interdependent equals would also engage them in practices that reach beyond expertise. In terms of composition, this classroom would situate the development of expertise in the pragmatic practices of writing and reading within the relational and, ultimately, political practice of a discursive exchange of equals that I have used the language of ethics to describe.

Recent discussions of the teaching of technical communication by Carolyn R. Miller and Stephen Doheny-Farina provide me with a more pedagogical language for that description. Miller describes this rhetorical practice when she suggests that we teach writing as "a matter of conduct rather than of production, as a matter of arguing in a prudent way toward the good of community rather than of constructing texts" (23). Adopting Miller's terms that contrast the conception of writing as a praxis with its
more conventional conception as a *technē*, Doheny-Farina develops this distinction:

Writing as technē is the production of texts; writing as praxis is the process of taking part in the discourse of a community. Courses on writing as technē teach how to write particular kinds of documents. Courses on writing as praxis try to socialize students to a community so that they may engage in the ongoing conversations of that community, and eventually contribute to the evolution or change of a community. Learning to write as praxis means learning the boundaries, customs, and languages of community, learning what counts as knowledge, learning what counts as appropriate forms, appropriate styles, and valid lines of reasoning, and deliberating on the means and goals of community. (222)

Yet even this kind of praxis can be directed toward the individualistic and exclusionary purposes of expertise and thus limit democratic community to the local. That is why the teaching of writing and reading as the praxis of maintaining a community that includes diverse equals must begin with the teaching of an attitude. And that is the function of ethical deference as I have described it here: it is an attitude toward even more importantly than it is an act within the discourse that constitutes community.

A rhetoric that treats writing and reading as the discourse that constitutes a community of differing equals situates the progress of a practice within the relational and political project of maintaining both full participation and cooperation. I am arguing that we should teach writing and reading as a means of making available for cooperative consideration the common needs that those differences enable us to identify. We can do that by teaching first a rhetoric that directs people to make space for the assertions of others as a part of the process of composing their own. The ethical project of that rhetoric is to teach the practice of a democratic citizenship. Ethics needs to be an explicit part of that teaching because the discourse of community so readily undermines equality. Even when directed by the most inclusive intentions, as James L. Kastely observes, we tend to “exclude others from the community not because we wish to do them injury or because we possess despicable motives but because we are trapped in our languages” (105). That is because, as I have argued elsewhere, our languages themselves impute agreement (*Dialogue* 50–52). The solution Kastely offers is similar to mine: he calls for an attitude of “rhetorical openness” that enables participants in the discourse of community to hold themselves open to refutations of “our understandings of ourselves and others so that these understandings do not become fixed and thereby close us to voices of others” (105–06). We enact this attitude by deferring conviction in our own assertions until we have considered the assertions
of others made in response, a sequence that directs the discourse of community to the maintenance of equitable relations first, and then to individual and collective work.

The discourse I am describing here renders the progress of expertise in a community secondary to a relational and epistemological practice of confronting differences so that its participants can come to understand how the beliefs and purposes of others can call their own into question. With this as its primary practice, the project of maintaining community can accommodate both equality and difference. Here people cooperate on the ground of an agreement to meet their differences openly, and that requires them each to rethink continually their own intentions and actions in terms of those of differing others. This is the only agreement that supports a democratic discourse of community. A classroom reconstructed along these lines would situate the development of expertise in writing and reading, or in anything else, within this agreement to rescue the discourse of community from domination and exclusion.

Notes

1. Notable in developing the rhetoric of the discourse community has been the work of Kenneth Bruffee, David Bartholomae, and Patricia Bizzell. Notable critiques of that rhetoric have come from Greg Myers, John Trimbur, and, again, Patricia Bizzell.

2. The critique of a culture of expertise developed here is derived from my essay written with S. Michael Halloran, "Transformations of Public Discourse in Nineteenth-Century America."

Works Cited


